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Message Text

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BIB-01 ISO-00 /086 W
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R 161040Z DEC 74
FM USDEL MBFR VIENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 791
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0516

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT ONLY TO NATO DEPT, TURKISH
FOREIGN MINISTRY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET PRESENTATION AT DECEMBER 12
PLENARY SESSION

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE END-OF-ROUND STATEMENT
PRESENTED BY SOVIET REP KHLESTOV AT THE DECEMBER 12
PLENARY MEETING. OUR RECORD OF THE IMPROMPTU REMARKS,
ADDED BY KHLESTOV TO HIS OFFICIAL TEXT, APPEARS IN
PARAGRAPHS 16, 23 AND 24 BELOW. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT
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OUR RECORD OF THE IMPROMTU REMARKS WAS DERIVED FROM THE

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LESS THAN RELIABLE CONFERENCE ENGLISH INTERPRETATION. BEGIN TEXT:

MR CHAIRMAN,

COMRADES AND GENTLEMEN,

1. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TODAY TO TAKE STOCK OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND OF THE WLRK DONE BY THE DELEGATIONS OVER THE YEAR, AND TO EXPRESS SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON WHEN WE REASSEMBLE IN JANUARY 1975.

2. WHILE NOTING IN GENERAL A CERTAIN VALUE OF THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE AT OUR PLENARY SESSIONS AND VARIOUS MEETINGS, IT MUST BE SAID THAT IT HAS SO FAR NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO BRING POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER, STILL LESS TO TAKE SPECIFIC DECISIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE CAUSES OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME THEM, AND TO SET ABOUT WORKING OUT PRACTICAL STEPS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN TABLING NEW PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD HAVE PERMITTED SPECIFIC MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS TO BE ATTAINED IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND.

4. THE SOCIALIST STATES PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE FINAL RESULT AND GOAL OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE MASSIVE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS IS THE TASK AND THE DIRECT DUTY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THE WORTH OF ONE OR ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM FACING THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND OF THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, MUST BE DETERMINED ABOVE ALL BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ASSIST THE SOLUTION OF THAT PROBLEM, WITH STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS,
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UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES AND NOT RECEIVING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

6. THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA HAS CLEARLY CONFIRMED THAT THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST STATES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, SET OUT IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973, IS OBJECTIVE AND EQUITABLE. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT IS BASED ON A

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SOBER ASSESSMENT OF THE REALITIES EXISTING IN THE CENTRE OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE AND IS A DETAILED PROGRAMME OF SPECIFIC AND PRACTICALLY REALISABLE REDUCTION STEPS.

7. THE PROGRAMME ENVISAGES THE FOLLOWING:
- THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN(SIC) CENTRAL EUORPE;
- PRECISE AND CLEAR OBLIGATIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS;
- A COMPREHENSIVE METHOD OF REDUCTION PERMITTING THE INCLUSION OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA IN QUESTION - GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND UNITS AND SUB-UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
- THE REDUCTION BOTH OF MANPOWER AND OF ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, ON A BASIS OF EQUAL NUMBERS AND EQUAL PERCENTAGES;
- THE CARRYING OUT OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OVER A COMPRESSED PERIOD - IN THE COURSE OF THREE YEARS.

8. THE PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIALIST STATES IN ALL RESPECTS FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLES, AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS, OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS, UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES AND NOT GAINING ANY UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH A BASIS AND THE CARRYING OUT OF PRACTICAL STEPS FOR THE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS WOULD SUPPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE WITH MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE, AND WOULD REINFORCE STABILITY IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATES OF EAST AND WEST, AND AT THE SAME TIME STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.
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9. WE HAVE ALREADY REPEATEDLY SHOW, TAKING OUR STAND ON FACTS, THAT THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, BOTH AS A WHOLE AND IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, CONTRADICTS THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES. HAVING MADE IT THEIR AIM TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE PERSISTENTLY TRYING TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AGREED SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS - THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE - THE REDUCTION ONLY OF GROUND FORCES, AND THAT ONLY OF TWO OF THEIR ELEMENTS - MANPOWER AND TANKS.

10. THEY PERSISTENTLY REPEAT IN THIS CONNECTION THE CONCEPT OF SO CALLED "DISPARITIES", ARTIFICIALLY ADVANCED BY THEM TO JUSTIFY

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THEIR PURPOSE OF CHANGING TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO THE RELATIONSHIP
OF FORCES WHICH HAS COME INTO BEING IN THE AREA. WE LONG AGO

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /086 W
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R 161040Z DEC 74
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0792
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
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SHOWED THAT THE CONCEPT OF "DISPARITIES" IS AN INVENTED AND
UNSCIENTIFIC ONE, IN THAT IN OUR TIME IT IS IMPOSSIBLE
OBJECTIVELY TO ASSESS THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARMED FORCES
BY TAKING ONLY ONE TYPE OF ARMED FORCES - GROUND FORCES.
IN THE COURSE OF FOUR ROUNDS WE HAVE THEREFORE TOLD THE
WESTERN DELEGATIONS DIRECTLY THAT THE POSITION ADOPTED BY
THEM IN NOVEMBER LAST YEAR IS UNREALISTIC, AND CANNOT
BECOME THE BASIS FOR THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE

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11. NEVERTHELESS, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THEIR EARLIER POSITION. THEY EVEN STATE THAT NO REDUCTIONS OTHER THAN "ASYMMETRICAL" ONES ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR THEM, AS IF THEY HAD COME TO NEGOTIATIONS NOT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, BUT RATHER ON THE REDUCTION FIRST OF ALL AND PRIMARILY OF THE TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

12. THE FOURTH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CONFIRMS THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE STILL NOT READY TO UNDER-TAKE THE SEARCH FOR DISCUSSIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH ARE AUTHENTICALLY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE.

- THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AS BEFORE ADVOCATE THE REDUCTION ONLY OF GROUND FORCES.

-AS BEFORE, THEY REFUSE TO REDUCE AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

-THE PLAN OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES COMPLETELY AVOIDS THE SCOPE AND ORDER OF REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, INCLUDNG NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

13. ONE OF THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS THE WESTERN DEMAND THAT A FIRST ONLY SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES BE REDUCED, WITH THE REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA POSTPONED TO A LATER TIME.
THESE COUNTRIES STILL - AFTER A YEAR OF NEGOTIATONS - REFRAIN FROM CLEAR STATEMENTS ON WHAT OBLIGATIONS THEY ARE WILLING TO TAKE UPON THEMSELVES WITH REGARD TO THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

14. IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE UNEQUAL OBLIGATIONS ON THE SOCIALIST STATES REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES ON AN "ASYMMETRICAL" BASIS, AND IN SO DOING TO SECURE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR NATO, HAVE NO CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. THIS IS NOT THE COURSE TO BE FOLLOWED IF WE ARE REALLY TO STRIVE FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

15. WE HAVE ALREADY REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SO-
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CALLED "MODIFICATIONS" WHICH THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE PROPOSED BE MADE TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION DO NOT CHANGE ITS UNILATERAL CHARACTER AND DO NOT FOR THAT REASON MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE. THESE "MODIFICATIONS" CONSIST OF NOTHING MORE THAN SOME CLARIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS OF THE REDUCTION PLAN WHICH WAS PRESENTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ON 22 NOVEMBER 1973. THESE "MODIFICATIONS" DO NOT IN FACT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ONE SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. MOREOVER, THE "MODIFICATIONS" WERE MADE ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT WE ACCEPT THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN, OUR EVALUATION OF WHICH IS WELL KNOWN.

16. (BEGIN IMPROMPTU REMARKS: THIS APPLIES TO THE REFERENCE IN THE STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USA WHEN HE SUGGESTED THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD SUBMITTED A MODIFICATION AS REGARDS THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF MANPOWER OF THE AIR FORCES. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, ALTHOUGH THIS HAS BEEN SUBMITTED AS A VERY LARGE STEP ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IN FACT THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT SUCH A STEP FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, BECAUSE AS IS WELL KNOWN, IT HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED AS PART OF THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMS. INSTEAD OF THIS IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT THEY ARE ONLY READ TO SUBSCRIBE TO COMMITMENTS NOT TO INCREASE MANPOWER IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. OUR ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESENT MODIFICATION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A VERY CONSIDERABLE STEP CAN BE SUBMITTED IN GREATER DETAIL, BUT THIS IS JUST A PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON IT. END IMPROMTU REMARKS).

17. DURING THE COURSE OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CALLED UPON US TO DISCUSS THE ARMED FORCE MANPOWER STRENTH OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THIS CONNECTION WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO REAFFIRM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE ATTENTION OF PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON BASIC QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE, SUCH AS: WHO WILL REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WHAT TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION AND IN WHAT PERIODS OF TIME.
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18. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND STRIVING TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THEM, THE SOCIALIST STATES PROPOSED CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON THE CARRYING OUT IN 1975 OF AN INITIAL REDUCTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, BELGIM, CANADA, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE FREDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WHICH WOULD TOTAL 20,000 MEN TOGETHER WITH ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS ENVISAGED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON A FURTHER MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES ANDARMAMENTS WOULD BE CONTINUED. IN THE NEW PROPOSAL A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, A SUBJECT WHICH WAS ADDRESSED IN DETAIL IN RECENT STATEMENTS BY DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

19. THIS PROPOSAL ALLOWS THE RAPID ACHIEVEMENT OF A CONCRETE UNDERSTANDING ON REDUCTIONS WITHOUT HARM TO THE BASIC POSITIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, HAVING ADMITTED THAT THIS PROPOSAL BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONTAINS "POSITIVE ELEMENTS", HAVE NOT YET DISPLAYED READINESS TO SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE INITIAL DECISION ON REDUCTIONS. THEIR REACTION WAS NEGATIVE. THEY DID NOT, FOR THEIR PART, PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS OR CONSIDERATIONS IN RESPONSE, STATING, IN SUBSTANCE, THAT ONLY A SOLUTION WHICH FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THEIR APPROACH, AND TO THEIR AIM OF GAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, CAN BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM.

20. RECENTLY THE SOCIALIST STATES ADVANCED STILL ANOTHER

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

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INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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IMPORTANT PROPOSAL, THE ADOPTION OF WHICH WOULD PROMOTE PROGRESS
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FACILITATE THE ATTAINMENT OF CONCRETE
SOLUTIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. WE
PROPOSED THAT THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE
UPON THEMSELVES THE OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL
STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE IMPORTANCE
OF THIS PROPOSAL WAS STATED IN DETAIL IN THE STATEMENT OF THE HEAD OF
THE DELEGATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AMBASSADOR R KLEIN, WHO, IN THE
NAME OF THE GDR, POLAND, THE USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TABLED FOR
EXAMINATION BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THE DRAFT
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JOINT DECLARATION AT THE SESSION OF 5 DECEMBER OF THIS YEAR. IN
ADVANCING THIS PROPOSAL, WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF THE
DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THEIR STATEMENTS IN
FAVOUR OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON NOT INCREASING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH
OF THE TROOPS OF THE PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

21. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE READINESS OF THE STATES WHICH
ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ASSUME THE
OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR TROOPS
DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TESTIFY TO THEIR DETERMINATION NOT
TO PERMIT ACTIONS WHICH COLD COMPLICATE THE CONDUCT OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND HINDER A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION OF THE TASK BEFORE
US - THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ISSUE BY THE DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE JOINT DECLARATION
PROPOSED BY US WOULD BE GREETED WITH APPROVAL BY ALL THE
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES AS A STEP SETTING A SERIOUS
OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF THE ARMS RACE IN EUROPE.

22. ALTHOUGH THE FIRST REACTION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO
THIS CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL WAS ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE, WE HOPE THAT

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THIS IS NOT THEIR LAST WORD.

MR CHAIRMAN,

23. (BEGIN IMPROMPTU REMARKS: NOW I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A
FEW REMARKS AS REGARDS THE
STATEMENT WHICH WAS MADE BY OUR DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE, THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WHO AT THE
BEGINNING OF HIS STATEMENT SAID THAT A NEW PROBLEM IS ARISING,
NAMELY WHETHER WE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, OR INSTEAD SHOULD SEEK OTHER LIMITED
INTERIM MEASURES. MR CHAIRMAN, SINCE THIS IN MY VIEW COULD
GIVE RISE TO ERRONEOUS IMPRESSIONS, I HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE UP
THIS PROBLEM. I THINK THAT ... TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
CHARACTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS .. THERE IS NO REASON AS THE
WESTERN PROPOSALS SUBMITTED ON THE 22 NOVEMBER ENVISAGE, TO
EMPHASISE AND STRESS THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF
ARMED FORCES. NOW IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE POSITION OF THE
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONTAINED IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF 8 NOVEMBER-
THIS IS OBVIOUSLY CRYSTAL CLEAR - WOULD COMMIT ALL PARTICIPANTS
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TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. NOW IN THIS SITUATION TO TABLE A
SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ABOUT INITIAL STEPS CANNOT OF COURSE BE
CONSIDERED OTHERWISE THAN AS A MEASN TO BRING ABOUT SUBSTANTIAL
REDUCTIONS AND COULD .... BY THE VERY END HELP IN SEEKING WAYS
AND MEANS FOR SUCH CUTS. THIS IS NORMAL PRACTICE IN INTER-
NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IF, FOR EXAMPLE, NO RAPID SOLUTION CAN
BE FOUND FOR .....REDUCTIONS, AND ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO
FIND A WAY WHICH WOULD IN TURN HELP US TO MAKE PROGRESS AND
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT SOME
SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. NOW IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IN ORDER
THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LACK OF FULL COMPREHENSION AMONG ALL
OUR DELEGATIONS, I THINK IT IS ALSO UNWARRANTED TO DWELL HERE
AND NOW, BEFORE DELEGATIONS GO TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES
FOR CHRISTMAS, ... ON THE CHANGES IN THE POSITION OF THE
WESTERN COUNTRIES WHEN WE UNDERSTAND ARE CARRIED OUT
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR SCHEME, (THAT WE SHOULD)
FOLLOW THE COURSE OF SEEKING WAYS AND MEANS WHICH ARE NECESSARY.
AT THE SAME TIME IN THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS MADE BY THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES ABOUT FIRST STEPS AND ABOUT MAKING COMMITMENTS NOT TO
INCREASE MILITARY MANPOWER - LET US TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE
STATEMENTS MADE ON THE FIRST STEP - IT IS EMPHASISED BY ALL
THAT THIS FIRST STEP SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH A VIEW TO
CONTINUING THE SEARCH FOR MORE SUBSTANTIAL CUTS, AND IN THE
PRESENT CASE THE IDEA OF TWO PHASES, WHICH WAS ALSO REFERRED
TO BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IS CONTINUALLY (EXPRESSED) AS
A GREAT PROPOSAL. LET US TAKE FOR EXAMPLE THE PROPOSAL NOT
TO INCREASE MILITARY MANPOWER; I BELIEVE IT IS RATHER STRANGE
TO CONTRAST WITH THIS THE ATTEMPT TO SUBSTITUTE IT BY

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CONSIDERABLE CUTS. IF WE CAN TAKE IN THIS CONNECTION THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ON PHASING AND NOT INCREASING MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES, THESE WERE ACCEPTED BY ALL NOT AS AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN TO ALL THE OTHER PROPOSALS, AT LEAST IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS BEEN STATED. I SUGGEST IF THEIR MODIFICATIONS CONTAIN ANY NON-INCREASE OF MILITARY FORCES BETWEEN PERIODS, THEN THIS WAS SUCH A PROPOSAL, AND APPLYING IT TO OUR PROPOSAL, NAMELY THAT THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF THEIR MILITARY FORCES DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, I THINK THIS IS ALSO INTENDED TO ATTAIN THE SAME TARGET AND OBJECTIVES, WHICH ARE REDUCTIONS.

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MR. CHAIRMAN,

24. I DECIDED TO BROACH THIS PROBLEM HERE AND NOW IN ORDER TO COMMEND SOME IDEAS BUT ALSO BECAUSE I THINK THAT THIS IDEA, BEING FIRST OF ALL NOT A VERY CORRECT ONE, IN CONNECTION WITH OUR PROPOSAL, COULD GIVE RISE TO DIFFICULTIES THROUGHOUT OUR NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE IF WE CONSIDER THE QUESTION FROM THIS ANGLE AND SAY THAT A NEW PROBLEM HAS CROPPED UP, AND THAT SOMEBODY TRIES INSTEAD OF SEEKING SOLUTIONS FOR SUBSTANTIAL CUTS TO LEAD THESE NEGOTIATIONS INTO ANOTHER CHANNEL, AND THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THIS COULD BE THAT WE DO NOT NEED AT ALL TO SEEK ANY FIRST MEASURES, IT WOULD NOT BE VERY PLEASANT FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS ALTOGETHER. BECAUSE ON THE CONTRARY IT SHOULD BE THE TASK OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS,IN ORDER TRULY TO BRING ABOUT PROGRESS, TO SEEK ANY MEASURES, FIRST STEPS AND OTHER MEASURES AND STEPS, WHICH WOULD EXPEDITE AND HELP US IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THOSE WHO ARE TRULY INTERESTED IN MAKING PROGRESS SHOULD THINK THIS OVER, IN ORDER TO FIND WAYS AND MEANS OR POSSIBILITIES THAT WOULD HELP US IN MAKING PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. END IMPROMPTU REMARKS).

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SECDEF WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
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25. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOICALIST STATES HAVE SUBMITTED FOR THE SCRUTINY OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THREE IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS:

- THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973 ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

- THE PROPOSAL TO UNDERTAKE AN INITIAL STEP REDUCTION IN 1975;
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- THE DRAFT JOINT DECLARATION OF STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING A NON-INCREASE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

26. OF OURSE, THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD PREFER TO CONCLUDE

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IMMEDIATELY AN AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY THE ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE - BY 15-17 PER CENT, AS IS PROPOSED IN OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT.

27. IN ADDITION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF OVERCOMING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAVE SHOWN FLEXIBILITY AND A READINESS TO COME TO AGREEMENT INITIALLY ON A SIMPLER STEP - THE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON A FIRST STEP OF REDUCTION WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENTS OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

28. THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE READY ALSO TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON THE ASSUMPTION BY THE ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THEOBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES WHICH THEY POSSESS IN THE SUBJECT AREA.

29. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE POSITION OF UNJUSTIFIED NEGATIVE-NESS TAKEN BY OUR WESTERN PARTNERS WITH REGARD TO THESE REALISTIC AND JUST PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES CERTAINLY DOES NOT PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF OUR COMMON BUSINESS, MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

30. WHAT HAVE THE WESTERN COUNTRIES PROPOSED FOR THEIR PART DURING THE FOURTH ROUND?

31. IN OUR OPINION, IT CAN BE JUSTLY SAID THAT THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE NOT ADVANCED ANY PROPOSALS COMPARABLE IN THEIR SIGNIFICANCE WITH THE INITIATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. IN CONTRAST TO THE SOCIALIST STATES, THEY HAVE NOT YET SHOWN A READINESS TO ACHIEVE MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY MEANS OF COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS WHICH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR POSITION. AS BEFORE, CONFIDENTIAL

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THE DETERMINING ELEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WAS THE PURSUIT OF UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND CHANGING TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO, AS A RESULT OF FUTURE REDUCTIONS, THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED INTO CENTRAL EUROPE.

32. WE WOULD LIKE IN THIS CONNECTION TO RECALL THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, L I BREZHNEV, IN HIS STATEMENT ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW AT THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF FEDERAL CHANNCELLOR SCHMIDT OF THE FRG ON 28 OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR STRESSED THAT IF THERE IS THE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO COME TO AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO REJECT DEMANDS WHICH ENSURE THE GAINING OF

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UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

3. OUR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY LASTED MORE THAN A YEAR. IT IS TIME FINALLY TO GO FROM WORDS TO DEEDS, AND TO WORK IN REAL EARNEST FOR THE SEARCH FOR CONCRETE SOLUTIONS. THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE READY FOR THAT. IT IS NOW UP TO THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. WE EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL IN THE NEXT ROUND SHOW READINESS TO ENGAGE, TOGETHER WITH THE SOCIALIST STATES, IN A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON THE REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

34. AS IS EMPHASISED IN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ADOPTED RECENTLY BY THE LEADERS OF A SERIES OF STATES REPRESENTED AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ACTIVELY PROMOTE THE FINDING OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IT IS PRECISELY THAT WHICH IS THE DUTY AND OBLIGATION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE ALREADY DONE MUCH TO ENSURE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WILL ALSO PROMOTE THIS IN THE FUTURE. END TEXT. RESOR

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